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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the institution of interlocking directorates between universal 
banks and industrial firms in the Kaiserreich (1871-1914) and demonstrates that such 
formalized relationships were unusual prior to 1900. The investigation indicates further 
that there was a marked increase in bank representation at firms-both in the share of 
firms involved in such relationships and in the number of joint directors-around the turn 
of the century. F inally, the work suggest a number of explanations for the pattern of 
bank relationships that emerges. 
RELATIONSHIP BANKING AND CORPORA TE GoVERNANCE IN THE KAISERREICH* 
Caroline Fohlin 
I. Introduction 
Economic historians have often pointed to the universal banks of the Kaiserreich as the 
prime example of Gerschenkron1s hypothesis that in moderately-backward economies, financial 
institutions act as an impetus for industrialization. The German banks combined short-term 
commercial business with long-term investment functions to become the supermarkets of financial 
services. The development of close relationships between bankers and industrialists, which is 
considered a fundamental characteristic of the universal banks, is thought to have made this style 
of finance an important link in the industrialization process. 1 
Long-term relationships between banks and firms are thought to have been established and 
maintained through placement ofrepresentatives on boards of directors (more accurately, the 
Aufsichtsrat). This practice of interlocking directorates has become a trademark of the German 
style of banking and of the Great Banks in particular. Passow ( 1905) gave a rare contrary 
interpretation of the Aufsichtsrat, concluding that directors' functions varied widely from firm to 
firm, and that no general inference could be made regarding the power of the institution. 
However, most have agreed with Jeidels ( 1905), who claimed, " . . .  the power of the Great banks is 
exercised via the legal institution of the Aufsichtsrat, rather than through direct influence of 
financial strength. "2 
The present paper focuses on the institution of interlocking directorates between universal 
banks and industrial firms and demonstrates that such formalized involvement was unusual prior 
to 1900. The research indicates further that there was a rapid increase in bank representation at 
*My thanks go to Lance Davis, Barry Eichengreen, Harold James, John Latting, andKen Snowden as well as EHA 
conference participants for their comments on this work Funding from the Joint Committee on Western Europe of the 
American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council (with Funds provided by the Ford and 
Mellon Foundations) is gratefully acknowledged. 
1Gerschenkron (1962), Jeidels (1905), Riesser (1911), Schumpeter (1939), and Whale (1930), among many others, 
have emphasized this point. 
2Jeidels (1905), p. 145, author's translation. 
firms--both in the number of firms involved in such relationships and in the number of joint 
directors--around the tum of the century. Thus, the move to interlocking directorates occurred 
after the period considered pivotal for heavy industrial development. 
This line of research is important for a number reasons. First, the lack of comprehensive 
evidence on the interaction between banks and firms in the last part of the nineteenth century 
stands as a glaring omission in the historiography of German corporate finance. Also, the :findings 
in this paper challenge long-standing assumptions about firm-bank relationships in Germany, and 
in doing so, it may also call into question other notions we have about German finance. 3 
The results of this research may also have implications for policymakers, who have long 
looked to Germany and its extended experience with universal banking as a model for banking 
regulation in the United States. In 19 1 1, the U. S .  Monetary Commission produced an English 
translation ofRiesser's ( 19 10) enormous work on the German Great Banks as part of the 
government's effort to analyze German banking practices. Today, the U. S .  Congress is in the 
process ofrepealing depression-era banking regulations (Glass-Steagall, in particular), based in 
part on the notion that a German-style system would be preferable. 4 
The paper is divided into the following parts. Section II gives a brief background on the 
relationships between banks and industry in the Kaiserreich and explains the rationale behind 
using interlocking directorates to measure bank involvement. Section III discusses the data 
sources and methods and section IV presents the results. Section V compares the :findings to the 
expected outcomes and offers several possible explanations for the contrary :findings. Section VI 
concludes. 
II. Background 
"The activity of the banks in the economic life of society has often been likened to that of the heart in the human 
body . . .  For just as it is the function of the heart to regulate by means of certain organs the circulation of the blood, which 
through countless arteries and veins flows through the human body and returns to the heart, so . . .  it is the function of the 
banks to regulate by certain economic measures the circulation of capital, which flows from them and returns to them, and 
3Indeed, Wellhoener's (1989) and Lee's (1991) books already challenge some of the assertions made by earlier 
historians. 
4Recent research that finds in favor of the universal system includes Calomiris (1994) and Saunders and Walter 
(1994). For a contrary point of view, see the recent New York Times OP-ED piece by John Moscow (June 28, 1995). 
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which may properly be regarded as the life blood of the modern economic organism. "5 
The credit banks--as indicated by the above analogy--were among the most prominent 
institutions in the German economy and society at the tum of the last century. Their operations 
extended to many realms of corporate finance, but they were particularly conspicuous due to their 
size. 6 The Kreditbanken, while accounting for fewer than 1 % of banking institutions in 1900, 
held over a quarter of all bank liabilities. On average, these banks each held over 100 million 
Marks in liabilities in 19 13 .  lbis number is yet more impressive when calculated for the nine 
great banks (932 million on average) and when compared to the savings banks, which averaged 
just over 6 million Marks of liabilities apiece. 7 
One of the features that distinguished the German universal banks from other financial 
institutions in Germany and elsewhere was the broad range of credit services they provided for 
their client firms. These included current accounts; acceptances, bill discounting, lombards and 
reports; brokerage; and promotions (meaning transformations, foundings, issuing, syndications 
and securities). The wide variety of operations was a matter of policy: Jeidels ( 1905)--a bank 
employee himself--commented that it was "in the interest of the security, profitability, and 
longevity of a credit institution to provide for all of the credit needs of a firm, from its formation 
to its liquidation. "8 Bank involvement normally began with the extension by the bank of current 
account privileges and progressed from the granting of various other forms of credit ultimately to 
the underwriting of the firm's securities. It is this combination of services within one institution-­
and the economies of scope that should theoretically result--that has led many to suggest that the 
5Riesser (1911) p. 186. An earlier, if more reseived, circulatory system reference can be found in Der Deutsche 
Okonomist of June 23, 1883. 
6There is an enormous literature describing both debit and credit operations. See, for example, Bosenick (1912), 
Buchwald (1909), Jeidels (1905), Motschmann{l915), Riesser (1910 [1911]), and Whale (1930). In Riesser (1911) 
see pp. 191-406 for an exhaustive discussion. 
7Computed from Deutsche Bundesbank (1976). 
8Jeidels (1905), p. 63, author's translation. Others also made this point. See, for example, Lansburgh (1909), Loeb 
(1902), and Staub (1900). 
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German financial system was more efficient than its contemporaries at the tum of the century. 9 
Less easily documented than credit operations is the common perception that the Great 
Banks played an important entrepreneurial role through identifying promising new industries and 
investments and by offering advice to their client firms. This hands-on style of financing is 
supposed to have been facilitated by the close, long-term relationships that banks fostered with 
industry. The literature on German universal banking suggests at least three indicators--all related 
to the banks' credit operations--ofthe existence of a long-term relationship between a bank and a 
firm: the extension of current account privileges to firms, the holding of firms' securities by a 
bank, and the placement of bank officials on the boards of directors of firms. 
A current account with a credit bank provided a firm with many services and opportunities 
for short-term credit, and such arrangements often led to the provision of other services. 
However, credit bank current accounts were widespread--particularly among joint-stock 
companies. Although the current account provided the bank with a window into the financial 
status of many firms, this insight could easily be impaired if the firm held accounts with more than 
one bank. Furthermore, a simple current account relationship would not have allowed monitoring 
of firms' investment projects--particularly when the firm had similar agreements with multiple 
banks. The existence of a current account alone, therefore, fails to discriminate between firms 
which had onJy a loose bank connection and those which were more intimate. 
A stronger link might be inferred if there were evidence that a bank held substantial 
quantities of a firm's securities. The German credit banks were actively involved in 
transformations of old firms into joint-stock companies and foundings of new firms. These 
activities were often followed by the issuing of the firm's stocks or bonds by the bank. As a result 
of many of these promotional operations, the banks usually held--both voluntarily and otherwise-­
the securities of their client firms, thereby providing further credit. Though the relationship 
resulting from promotional activities was almost certainly closer than that suggested by a current 
account, the holding of firm securities was nonetheless common and is therefore a weak indicator 
of bank attachment. 
The most powerful expression of a firm-bank relationship--one that has been emphasized 
9See, for example, Calomiris (1994) and Kennedy (1987). 
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repeatedly--is the placement of bank directors on firms' supervisory boards (Aufsichtsrat). 10 In 
addition to direct power through voting rights, positions on firms' boards would have allowed 
banks access to the inner workings of the firms they :financed and also would have, in theory at 
least, acted both as a commitment mechanism between the two organizations and as a quality 
signal to investors. When the same banker is found on a given firm's board for several years on 
end, it would seem appropriate to assume that a close relationship existed between that bank and 
firm. 
Ideally, all three indicators of bank attachment could be used to measure gradations of 
involvement. However, due to the paucity of firm-level data on current accounts and securities 
holdings, the investigation must be limited to interlocking directorates. While this criterion may 
overlook firms with weak connections to a bank, it should not falsely categorize firms with no 
bank relationships as attached. Furthermore, since the three types of interaction normally 
occurred as steps  towards increased involvement, it may perhaps be assumed that firms and banks 
with overlapping boards had already progressed through the current account and securities issue 
stages. 
Whether or not the bank successfully exerted influence through firms' boards of directors 
remains to be determined, but the presence of bank representatives on company directorates still 
offers strong evidence of bank connections. It is, therefore, worthwhile to investigate the 
development of such relationships. 
ill. Data 
The data for this study were compiled from the industrial securities reports in Saling's 
Borsen-Jahrbuch, a stock market annual targeted toward bankers and investors. Saling's was 
published annually starting in 1877/8 and included several types of information for investors. Part 
II of Saling's, the series used in this study, contains entries on hundreds of joint-stock companies 
10The American term Board of Directors does not accurately correspond to German corporate governance forms. 
German joint-stock firms were controlled by two separate bodies. The Vorstand was made up of firm managers who 
oversaw day to day operations, while the Auftichtsrat was comprised of representatives of shareholders' interests. 
These members were not required to hold equity positions in the firms on whose boards they sat. 
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traded at the Berlin stock exchange--including balance sheet summaries, profit and loss 
statements, listings of their Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat members, as well as histories of their share 
capital, relative share prices, and dividends. Although Saling's offers no clear discussion of 
criteria used for inclusion of a particular firm, it is clear from other sources that many firms that 
were not officially listed on the Berlin exchange were referenced in this series in the early years. 
For example, while 250 domestic industrial firms (that is, excluding banks, insurance companies, 
other commercial enterprises, and railroads) can be found in the 1 880 issue of Saling's--part II, 
only 4 1  industrial shares (including bond issues) were officially listed in Berlin in 1 880.  By 1900, 
there existed approximately 3 ,000 joint-stock firms in Germany. Jn this year, 753 industrial 
securities had official listings in Berlin, and Saling's--part II reported on 626 industrial firms in its 
Berlin report. 1 1  Thus, the data source may be biased toward larger, more established firms. 12 
The analysis is based on three samples: 1. a continuous panel of 50 long-lived firms that 
were traded at the Berlin Bourse between 1880 and 1913 ;  2. a continuous, random panel of 50  
new joint-stock firms (covering the same period); and 3 .  eight random cross-sections of 25 firms 
each, selected at four-year intervals from 1882 through 19 10.  Sample I reflects the sectoral 
distribution of joint-stock companies reported in Saling's in 1900. The data were also chosen to 
represent size and geographical variation, and selection was limited to those firms in existence 
prior to 1880 (with the exception of A.E.G. ,  which was founded in 1883) . 13 
The sample II firms were randomly selected from those with entries published in the 1900 
issue of Saling's and follow roughly the same pattern of sectoral distribution as sample I. 
Selection was constrained to the set of firms that began operations as joint-stock companies after 
11Computed from Sombart (1913) and Saling's (1883/4, 1901/2). 
12Potential biases are discussed further below. There were other stock market yearbooks, at least one of which 
covered all joint-stock firms. Unfortunately none of these was published until 1895, and the volumes prior to 1910 are 
scarce. 
13The firms in the sample are on average 2 to 4 times larger than their corresponding sectoral means, but this may 
result from the selection criterion of long-lived firms and biases toward larger fmns in the data source rather than from 
the lack of randomness in sampling. 
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1 879 to allow for testing of start-up effects. 14 Sample III was selected randomly and without any 
constraints on the population. The firms in the samples fall into nine sectoral categories: milling 
and smelting, metal, textiles, chemicals, electrical, construction, transportation and shipping, food 
products, and miscellaneous. 
The three samples permit investigation of a variety of phenomena. For example, samples I 
and II allow comparisons between given sets oflong-lived and newly-organized firms over an 
extended period, while sample ill is necessary for comparing rates of relationship formation over 
the period 1880-19 13 ,  without regard to the age or longevity of the particular firms involved. 
By comparing the board members of the firms in the samples with those of all joint-stock 
banks listed in Saling's in the same years (which includes all of the Great Banks and nearly-Great 
Banks as well as hundreds of smaller, similarly structured credit banks), I have determined which 
banks were represented on the firms' boards and how many directors were members of both bank 
and firm boards. Sample I and II firm boards were cross referenced with the bank boards for 
1882, 1 894, 1900, 1905,  and 19 10 . 1 5  Similarly, sample III firms were matched with the banks 
listed in Saling's for the years corresponding to the eight sub-samples--1882, 1 886, 1 890, 1 894, 
1 898, 1902, 1906, and 1910. 
It would be desirable to establish whether an individual found on multiple boards was a 
representative from the bank to the firm or vice versa. It is difficult to make such a distinction, 
since we are considering, for the most part, positions of equivalent stature. The chair and vice­
chair are indicated in Saling's, but it is not clear that a chairmanship may be equated with primary 
allegiance. The Vorstand is comprised of firm managers, and thus presence in that body denotes a 
degree of control not indicated by membership in the Aufsichtsrat. However, since few of the 
14Some firms may have operated under alternate forms before becoming joint-stock companies. Such firms are 
eliminated from consideration to the extent that they are identifiable. Transformation into the joint-stock form was 
often associated with an increase in capital and other significant changes in operations, and thus can be seen as the 
beginning of a new stage in the life of the firm. Because the firms are organized in the book alphabetically by industry, 
I chose the firms for the sample by selecting the first firm after every nth page to meet the post-1879 founding criterion 
(where n was equal to the total number of pages in the book divided by the number offlfllls sampled). A random 
number generator produces similar results. 
151 began by testing for attachment at a few points throughout the period in an attempt to confirm the assumption 
that attachment status was constant throughout. Since this turned out not to be the case, I added intervening points. I 
am in the process of checking for interlocking directorates in the remaining years. 
7 
joint members found in the samples considered here were members of any Vorstand, the problem 
remains.16 The Adressbuch der Direktoren und Aufsichtsratmitglieder, an alphabetical listing of 
all Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat members of firms traded in Berlin, lists all firms (in all sectors) on 
which each individual held a board position.17 Like Saling's, the Adressbuch indicates the position 
held, but it does not give any indication of primary allegiance. 
Tables IA-C give the average age as well as average and median paid-in capital for the 
three samples in each of the tested years. The variation in the numbers underscore the differences 
among the three datasets. The averages for sample ID, because its selection was unconstrained, 
gives an idea of the average age and size of joint-stock firms (traded in Berlin) at several points 
throughout the period. The sample ill data also allow a gauging of the magnitude of the bias 
introduced into samples I and II by their respective sampling criteria. 
Given the sampling criteria, it is natural that, in each year, the long-lived firms of sample I 
are the oldest on average and the newly-public enterprises of sample II are the youngest. 
TABLE IA 
AGEAND PAID-1N CAPITAL: SAMPLE! 
Year Sample Mean paid-in capital Median paid-in capital Mean age 
size (thousands ofMarks} (thousand of Marks} (years} 
1882 50 5 ,046. 10 2,700 15 . 5 0  
1894 50 6,882. 98 3 ,440 27.50 
1900 50 1 1 ,658 .37  4,3 50 3 3 . 5 0  
1905 50 14, 102. 14 4,849 3 8. 5 0  
1910  50 19  607.79 4 849 43. 50  
16In some cases, a bank name is listed in brackets next to the individual's name, but there is no explanation given. It 
is possible, but not verifiable, that the label distinguished official bank representatives from individuals with only a 
coincidental joint membership. Saling's also frequently indicates private banks in brackets after the representatives' 
names, but again it is not clear that all such associations are consistently given. Nonetheless, since private banks would 
not have had thejoint�stock form, it is probably safeto assume that membets'for whom a private bank connection is 
indicated were primarily involved with the given bank. The role of private bankers is an important avenue for future 
research. See Wixforth and Ziegler (1994). 
17That this addressbook of all board members and their affiliations only began publishing around 1899 is notable, 
because it fits with the suggestion that the organs of firm ownership and control were neither large nor highly 
complicated in the nineteenth century. 
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TABLEIB 
AVERAGE AGE AND PAID-IN CAPITAL: SAMPLE II 
Year Sample Mean paid-in capital Median paid-in capital Mean age 
size (thousands ofMarks} (thousand ofMarks} (years} 
1882 3 1 ,803 . 3 3  8 10 0 .67 
1894 10  3 ,557 .05  2,650 10 . 10  
1900 25 4,797.62 3 ,000 9. 52 
1905 25 5 ,543 . 34 2,800 14. 52 
1910  2 1  5 893 . 50  2 500 19 . 14 
TABLE IC 
AVERAGE AGE AND PAID-IN CAPITAL: SAMPLE Ill 
Year S a mp l e  Paid-in capital Median paid-in capital Age 
size (thousands ofMarks} (thousand ofMarks} (years} 
1882 25 4,538 .98  2,655  12.48 
1886 25 4,094.46 2,520 12.64 
1890 25 2,769. 70 2, 142 13 .08  
1894 25 5 ,071 . 20 2,200 15 .48  
1898 25 3 ,843 . 13 2,250 15 .24 
1902 25 4,360 .07 2, 5 50  15 . 12 
1906 25 8,523 . 07 3 ,000 2 1 . 60 
1910  25 14 6 19 .48 4 047 2 1 . 32  
Though the average paid-in capital of sample I firms is consistently several times that of 
the corresponding averages for sample II, the growth rate of average capitalization is similar for 
the two samples over the full period. In the case of Sample III, average paid-in capital appears 
steady--with the exception of a slight drop in 1890--for the twenty years between 1 882 and 1902. 
The averages for 1906 and 1 9 10 demonstrate distinct increases--with average share capital more 
than tripling in the eight years following 1902. Comparing median paid-in capital for the three 
samples, it is clear that there is less disparity in the firm sizes than is suggested by the sample 
means. Also, the means are uniformly higher for all years and all samples than the corresponding 
medians; reinforcing what is apparent from the firm-level data--that there are a few very large 
firms driving up the mean of paid-in capital. 
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The firms in Saling's are clearly not representative of all joint-stock firms, but the bias-­
particularly in the earlier years--is less extreme than might be expected. For example, data 
reported in Sombart ( 19 13)  on numbers of firms and their share capital, generates an overall 
average capital of2,362 thousand Marks in 190 1 and 2,299 thousand Marks in 19 10 .18 The data 
was reported in Der deutsche Okonomist, and apparently covers all joint-stock firms in industrial 
production. Thus, transport companies--many of which were large relative to the mean--were 
excluded. An estimate of average capital calculated from data in Das Handbuch der deutschen 
Aktiengesellschaften, a book similar to Saling's covering all joint-stock firms, produces analogous 
results for 1905 . In that year, average capital for a random sample of 100 firms from the 
Handbuch was 4,27 1 thousand Marks, while the median was 1 , 122 thousand Marks. 
The unsurprising inference is that Saling's--or more accurately, the Berlin bourse--tended 
to under-represent smaller firms. If the bias remained constant, then consistent overrepresentation 
ofbank-attached firms would be likely, given the bias of the (great) banks toward involvement 
with larger firms. However, if this bias increased over time--which it may have done--then later 
years might oversample attached firms more than earlier years. Since the share of all joint-stock 
firms reported in Saling's fell faster before 1900 than after, and since the patterns of attachment 
reported below are similar for all three samples, regardless of the sampling criteria, it is doubtful 
that restricting attention to firms listed in Berlin can account for a significant portion of the 
increase in the occurrence of interlocking directorates demonstrated in this paper. 
IV. Results 
The tables below report three sets of indicators that illuminate the changes in interlocking 
directorates between 1882 and 19 10. Part 1 reports the percent of the full sample as well as the 
share of attached firms that were involved in relationships with various types of universal banks. 
Part 2 presents data on the average size of firms' executive and supervisory boards and on the 
average overlap between bank and firm boards. The final part, part 3 ,  gives the share of all firms 
and of attached firms with chair and vice-chair positions filled by concurrent bank board members. 
18The average for 1910 seems low, but I have no way of checking his figures with the data I have currently. 
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1 .  Percent of firms with interlocking directorates 
The first part of Tables IIA through ITC gives the percentages of all firms with interlocking 
directorates in the various years tested. Tue second part of the table then gives a :further 
breakdown of attached firms by bank type. Great banks are the following 9 banks: Deutsche 
Bank, Dresdner Bank, Discontogesellschaft, Bank far Handel und Industrie, A. 
Schaafjh.ausen'scher Bankverein, Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, Commerz und Disconto Bank, 
National Bank far Deutsch/and, and Mitteldeutsche Creditbank. All other joint-stock mixed 
banks are considered provincial banks. 19 Combined attachment (fourth and eighth columns) 
indicates the presence of interlocking directorates with both a Great Bank and a provincial bank. 
In some cases, one individual sat on several different bank boards in addition to the firm's board. 
In the three samples, cases in which such an individual was the only bank representative on the 
firm board are unusual but are nonetheless counted as combined attachment. 
The fifth column in each table gives the percentage of the sampled firms with at least one 
concurrent bank board member (i. e. , interlocked firms). In the four test years from 1 894 on, 
Sample II has a slightly higher proportion of interlocked firms than Sample I, but--despite the age 
difference in the underlying populations--the two samples exhibit similar patterns of interlocking 
directorates over time. 
TABLEIIA 
PERCENT OF FIRMS WITH INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES, BY BANK TYPE: SAMPLE I 
Percent of full sample Percent of interlocked firms 
Provincial Great Combined Total Provincial Great Combined 
Year banks banks banks banks 
1882 8 4 0 10 67 33  0 
1 894 10 8 0 18  56  44 0 
1900 20 8 4 32 63 25 13 
1905 26 6 42 74 3 5  8 57 
19 10  30  12  3 8  80 3 8  1 5  48 
19The specific category of banks used is  called Deutsche verschiedene Banken in Saling's. 
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TABLEIIB 
PERCENT OF FIRMS WITH INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES, BY BANK TYPE: SAMPLE II 
Percent of full sarrwle Percent of interlocked firms 
Provincial Great Combined Total Provincial Great Combined 
Year banks banks banks banks 
1 882 0 0 0 0 
1 894 20 0 0 20 100 0 0 
1900 24 16 4 44 55  36  9 
1905 28 20 36  84 33  24 43 
19 10  19  10 62 9 1  2 1  1 1  68 
Differences between the two samples emerge in the breakdown of attachments by bank 
type. Summing columns three and four produces the percentage of firms with great bank 
connections regardless of the presence of a provincial bank. For the young firms of Sample II, the 
great bank share increased from zero to twenty percent from 1894 to 1900. In contrast, great­
bank attachment among the older firms of Sample I rose only four points from 8 to 12 percent. 
By 1910, 72% of Sample II firms had interlocking directorates with at least one great bank, while 
50% of Sample I firms were engaged in similar arrangements. Tue differences between the two 
samples in the shares of firms with great-bank and provincial-bank involvement suggest that there 
are particular firm characteristics that lead to bank involvement--whether initiated by the bank or 
the firm. For example, while the firms in sample II were certainly smaller on average than those in 
Sample I, it is possible that the newly-public firms were faster growing or higher profit than their 
older counterparts. 20 
One valid concern about the trend toward increased bank involvement found in the first 
two samples, is the possibility that attachment is correlated with age. Thus, as the firms in the 
samples age, they might be more likely to interlock their directorates. Given the wide range of 
ages in the samples in any given year, it seems doubtful that the aging of the firms could explain 
such a dramatic shift iri attachment. Nonetheless, it is use:ful to compare the results for Samples I 
2°Finn-level analysis, a topic that is beyond the scope of the current paper, is the appropriate route to understanding 
the variation in attachment patterns between the two samples. This is discussed further in the following section. 
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and II to those for the eight :independent, random cross sections :in Sample ill. 
Sample III data are given in Table ITC, and the results for the three samples are plotted 
together on Figure 1 .  Because the eight samples are independent of one another, each provides a 
snapshot of bank-firm relations in the tested year. The share of firms with interlocking 
directorates follows the same course as the first two samples--running closer to Sample I in the 
earlier years and Sample II in the later years. The breakdown of interlocking directorates by bank 
type shows some variation among the samples, however, there does not seem to be any consistent 
bias in Samples I and II compared to Sample III. 
TABLE IIC 
PERCENT OF FIRMS WITH INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES, BY BANK TYPE: SAMPLE ill 
Percent of full sam12le Percent of interlocked firms 
Year Provincial Great Combined Total Provincial Great Combined 
banks banks banks banks 
1882 4 8 0 12 33  67 0 
1 886 8 8 0 16 50  50  0 
1890 16  8 0 24 67 33  0 
1894 12 12 0 24 50  50  0 
1898 16 4 12 32 50 13 38 
1902 36  8 16 60 60 13 27 
1906 48 8 32 88 5 5  9 36  
19 10  36  8 44 88 4 1  9 50  
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Figure 1: Percent of Finns with futerlocking Directorates 
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Tables IIIA-C present data on the mean size of executive and supervisory boards, as well 
as the average number and share of joint bank members in those boards. Joint bank members are 
those individuals with positions on both the firm board and at least one bank board. Firms 
without bank representation are excluded from the calculation of means in order to avoid biasing 
these numbers downward in the early years, when most firms had no bank representation. 
The data on executive board memberships is striking for the scarcity of interlocking 
directorates that it demonstrates--even in the later years. Before 1900, only one firm in any of the 
three samples had joint bank members on its executive board, and that firm was one of the older 
firms in Sample I. That sample shows a significantly higher percentage of interlocked executive 
boards than Samples II and III throughout the period. Nonetheless, a comparison with the 
supervisory board numbers makes it clear that the executive board was not the primary channel 
14 
for bank-firm relationships at any time during the period. For example, even in 19 10, when 26% 
of Sample I firms had interlocked executive boards, 80% of the sampled firms had interlocked 
supervisory boards. Also notable is the finding that, almost without exception, the average 
number of joint executive board members was one--even as the average size of the boards grew. 
TABLEillA 
AVERAGE BOARD SIZE AND BANK OVERLAP: SAMPLE l 
Executive board (Vorstanef) Su�erviso!)'. board (Auf§ichtsrat) 
Year Total Number with Percent Total Number with Percent 
number joint bank interlocked number joint bank interlocked 
of members membership a with bankb of members membershipa with bankb 
(for values > 02 (for values> 02 
1882 1.60 l 100 0.92 1 80 
1894 2.18 1 100 1.24 1 79 
1900 2.56 1 50 1.74 1.13 62 
1905 2.82 1 52 7.58 3.70 39 
1910 3.26 1 43 7.92 3.98 41 
"Number offum board members with concurrent membership on a bank board (Vorstand or Aufeichtsrat). 
bPercent of board members with concurrent membership on a bank board (Vorstand or Aufeichtsrat). Both measures are calculated only 
for firms with a positive number of joint members. 
Year 
1882 
1894 
1900 
1905 
1910 
TABLEIIIB 
AVERAGE BOARD SIZE AND BANK OVERLAP: SAMPLE II 
Executive board (Vorstanef) 
Total Number with Percent 
number joint bank interlocked 
of members membership a with bankb 
(for values > 02 
2.00 
1.30 
1.64 
1.76 1 58 
2.14 1 32 
Su�erviso!)'. board (Auf§ichtsrat) 
Total Number with Percent 
number joint bank interlocked 
of members membership a with bankb 
(for values> 02 
1.00 0 0 
1.40 1.00 35 
2.36 1.18 63 
5.92 1.90 35 
6.14 2.00 33 
"Number of firm board members with concurrent membership on a bank board (Vorstand or Aufeichtsrat). 
bPercent of board members with concurrent membership on a bank board (Vorstand or Aufeichtsrat). Both measures are calculated only 
for firms with a positive number of joint members. 
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Year 
1882 
1886 
1890 
1894 
1898 
1902 
1906 
1910 
TABLEIII C 
AVERAGE BOARD SIZE AND BANK OVERLAP: SAMPLE Ill 
Executive board (Vorstand). 
Total Number with Percent 
number joint bank interlocked 
of members membership a with bankb 
{for values > 02 
1.76 
1.80 
1.88 
1.64 
1.92 
2.12 
2.28 1.00 20 
3.04 1.50 29 
Superviso� board (Auf};ichtsrat) 
Total Number with Percent 
number joint bank interlocked 
of members membershipa with bankb 
{for values > 0) 
1.08 1.00 100 
1.04 1.00 75 
1.24 1.00 70 
1.48 1.00 59 
2.00 1.38 59 
5.56 2.07 31 
6.08 2.74 39 
7.04 3.00 35 
"Number of firm board members with concurrent membership on a bank board (Vorstand or Aufsichtsrat). 
hPercent of board members with concurrent membership on a bank board (Vorstand or Aufsichtsrat). Both measures are calculated only 
for firms with a positive number of joint members. 
The data on the supervisory boards indicates a similar, if more extreme, increase in size 
and decrease in extent of interlocking (i. e . ,  percent ofboards made up of joint bank members) as 
that found for the executive boards. Jn contrast to the pattern for the executive boards, the 
average number of joint bank members in the supervisory boards increased noticeably after 1900. 
For those interested in the relative power of the universal banks and industrial firms during 
this period, the data on executive boards should be particularly interesting. Since executive 
boards were made up of managers, it is likely that members of that body were associated primarily 
with the firm on whose executive board they sat. Therefore, executive board members with 
concurrent bank and firm affiliations were likely representatives from the firm to the bank. Under 
such assumptions, the rising share of firms with interlocking executive boards suggests growing 
power of industrial firms with respect to the banks and not the reverse. 
The increase in the average number of joint supervisory board members--ifthe result of 
increasingly reciprocal representation--might also be construed as evidence of an expansion of the 
firms' influence. Furthermore, the rising numbers of joint board members often meant a 
concurrent increase in the number ofbanks represented at the firms (whether directly from the 
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bank or indirectly via other firm board members). It is easy to imagine that the value to the bank 
of information gathered would be diluted with the appointment of competitor banks' 
representatives. While the onset of multiple bank contacts may have been engineered by 
competing banks, it may also have been the work of the firms themselves--indicating further that 
firms were loosening the banks' grasp . 21 
3 .  Banker-held board chairmanships 
Tables IV A-C present the final piece of evidence on the evolution of interlocking 
directorates around the turn of the century--the percentage of firms with bankers holding the 
chairmanship or the vice-chairmanship of the supervisory board. The first part of the table 
presents the percentages for the full sample, while the second part gives the shares for interlocked 
firms only. The trend is toward a growing share of all firms with the top supervisory positions 
held by concurrent bank board members, but a dwindling proportion of attached firms with these 
posts held by bankers. 
TABLE IVA 
BANKER-HELD SUPERVISORY BOARD CHAIRMANSHIPS: SAMPLE I 
Percent of sample with the following positions Percent of interlocked firms: 
held by bank board member: 
Year Chaira Vice-chairb Both Chair or Vice-chair 
1882 1 0 0 83 
1894 12 6 2 89 
1900 12 16 2 8 1  
1905 32 26 8 57 
1910  42 28 18  65  
"Chair of the supervisory board (Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrat) 
bVice-chair of the superviso1y board (Stellvertretender Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrat) 
21It is not the goal of this paper to resolve the debate over the power of the universal banks. On Bankenmacht, see 
one of the original critics, Hilferding (1910), as well as the modem reexaminations by Welllioner (1989) and Wixforth 
and Ziegler (1995). 
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TABLEIVB 
BANKER-HELD SUPERVISORY BOARD CHAIRMANSHIPS: SAMPLE II 
Percent of sample with the following positions Percent of interlocked firms: 
held by bank board member: 
Year Chaira Vice-chairh Both Chair or Vice-chair 
1882 0 0 0 
1894 20 0 0 100 
1900 28 4 0 73 
1905 52 20 12 71 
1910 48 19 6 58 
"Chair of the supervisory board (Vorsitzender des Aujsichtsrat) 
bVice-chair of the supervisory board (Stellvertretender Vorsitzender des Aujsichtsrat) 
TABLE IVC 
BANKER-HELD SUPERVISORY BOARD CHAIRMANSHIPS: SAMPLE III 
Percent of sample with the following positions held Percent of interlocked firms: 
by bank board member: 
Year Chaira Vice-chairb Both Chair or Vice-chair 
1882 12 0 0 100 
1886 8 8 0 100 
1890 24 0 0 100 
1894 16 8 0 100 
1898 24 12 4 100 
1902 28 16 4 67 
1906 48 40 24 73 
1910  48  40 24 73 
achair of the supervisory board (Vorsitzender des Aujsichtsrat) 
bVice-chair of the supervisory board (Stellvertretender Vars itzender des Aujs ichtsrat) 
Though the share of attached firms with bankers in top positions was apparently in 
decline, the overall percentage remained strong throughout the period--averaging approximately 
68 percent for all samples from 1900 on. As in the case of the data on board representation in 
general, it is not possible to determine with certainty that the individuals holding the concurrent 
bank and firm positions were emissaries from the bank to the firm. Therefore, it is difficult to 
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draw any conclusions about changing bank influence from these numbers. 
The findings in these as well as the earlier tables indicate rapid growth in the number and 
extent of interlocking directorates around 1900. The remainder of this paper compares the 
specific findings to those that would be anticipated based on existing research and offers several 
explanations for the apparent deviations from expectations. 
V. Interpreting the results 
1 .  Results vs. expectations 
The empirical investigation above uncovers several patterns in the size and shape of firm 
supervisory and executive boards; many of which run counter to the conventional wisdom on 
German universal banks and their operations around the tum of the century. The following five 
sub-sections compare the main findings to the expected results. 
A Increasing share of firms with interlocking directorates with banks 
The main result--that interlocking directorates were not pursued to a great extent before 
1900 but expanded rapidly thereafter--is surprising. Conclusions of earlier writers on the subject­
-from Jeidels, Riesser, and Sombart to Schumpeter and Gerschenkron--have impressed modem 
researchers with the importance of bank representation in the financing of industrialization during 
the nineteenth century. Also, one could reasonably assume that as industrial development 
progressed into the twentieth century, the need for close bank involvement would diminish, not 
grow. 
B .  Increasing size of firm boards and decreasing share ofinterlocked boards' positions held by 
joint bank members 
The expansion. of firm boards in general does not come as a surprise, when the growth in 
average paid-in capital is considered. Jn general, as the share capital grew, the number of 
shareholders requiring representation also rose. The declining share of each board's positions held 
by a concurrent bank board member follows directly from this increase in the size of boards. 
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C. Rising number of joint board members on firms' board; increasing share of firms with 
interlocking directorates with multiple banks; and decreasing share of firms with great bank-only 
or provmcial bank-only connections 
B ankers may not have been able to keep up with the growth of supervisory boards, but the 
average number of joint positions did increase noticeably. Furthermore, the share of firms with 
interlocking directorates with multiple banks increased--resulting in a smaller share of firms 
maintailling ties with only great banks or only provincial banks. It is difficult, however, to know 
what to make of the findings on the changing composition of firms' supervisory boards. On the 
face of it, an increasing number of bank ties gives the impression of proliferating bank 
relationships. Yet there are several reasons--discussed in section b--to believe that these :findings 
are indicative of decreasingly-close bank ties. If true, and bank ties were becoming looser, then 
the results are in line with the expected decline in the importance of bank-firm relationships over 
the course of development. Some alternative explanation for the expansion of interlocking 
directorates would then be needed. 
D. Increasmg share of firms with banker-held chair or vice-chair and decreasmg share of attached 
firms with banker-held chair or vice-chair 
The percent of sampled firms with (apparently) banker-held chairmanships rose after the 
turn of the century. As a share of interlocked firms, the number of firms with bank board 
members in the top positions was actually declining, yet the level remamed high throughout the 
period. Like the increase in the number of banks represented in firms' supervisory boards, the 
changes in the proportion of firms with banker-held chairs or vice-chairs has multiple 
interpretations with respect to the relative power of banks and firms. However, if we ignore the 
questions of power and representation, and instead focus on the number of interactions between 
banks and firms, then the volume of new relationships implied by these :findmgs is impressive. 
Unless they were initiated for reasons other than those normally associated with the German 
bankers (that is, other than to allow the banks to monitor their investments in firms), a burst of 
new relationships after the main thrust of industrialization had passed would not be expected. 
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E. Increasing share of firms with interlocked executive boards 
One final piece of evidence on the evolution of the corporate governance structure of 
German firms is the changing shape of firm executive boards. The growing independence of firms 
after 1900 that might be suggested by the increased share of firms with interlocked executive 
boards is only surprising to those who continue to believe that firms were dominated by banks 
into the twentieth century. However, relative to the supervisory board, the executive board has 
attracted little attention from contemporary commentators or modem researchers (perhaps 
precisely because of the assumption that firms would not have exercised that kind of power). 
Thus, there is no consensus on the role of the Vorstand in the development of firm-bank 
relationships in the Kaiserreich. 
2. Explaining the contrary findings 
There are several possible interpretations for the seemingly contrary results presented in 
this paper: 1 .  pre-1900 board interaction has been underestimated, 2. post-1900 board 
representation by banks has been overstated, or 3 .  the historiographical emphasis on interlocking 
directorates has been misplaced. That is, the practice of interlocking directorates may have 
developed in response to changes in German corporate and economic structure around the tum of 
the century and may have therefore played a far weaker role in the primary push to industrial 
development than has thus far been conjectured. 
A Undercounting of interlocking directorates through 1900 
Tue possibility that board membership is underestimated is a real one. Saling's 
consistently lists the chair and vice-chair (if present) throughout the period, but in some cases it 
appears likely that it omits the other members of the supervisory board. For A.E. G. ,  for example, 
only the chair (which was vacant at the time) and the two vice-chairs were listed in 1900, while 9 
other members were mentioned in 190 1 .  Thus, the count of the Aufsichtsrat members would 
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increase from 2 to 12 within one year--an unlikely scenario . 22 
There are several factors that mitigate the problem of underestimating pre-1900 
representation. To begin with, A.E. G. is hardly representative of the population, and so the 
undercounting of board members would be exaggerated if based on this type of firm 
Furthermore, while the exclusion of non-chair members certainly biases downward the average 
size of supervisory boards through 1900, it causes significantly less trouble with the estimates of 
the share of firms with any bank involvement. Throughout the post-1900 period--that is, even 
after the full boards began to be reported--a high percentage of firms with interlocking 
directorates maintained a bank connection in the chair or vice-chair position. Since the chair and 
vice-chairs were always reported, a high percentage of the firms with bank attachments will have 
been identified--even if additional bank connections for these firms have been overlooked. Based 
on the post-1900 average of the shares of interlocked firms with banker-held chair or vice-chair-­
approximately 68%--the pre-1900 shares of firms with bank interaction should be increased by as 
much as 20 points. Table V gives the shares of the three samples with any bank attachment, in 
which the shares for years through 1900 are adjusted using the assumption of 68% banker-held 
chair or vice-chair. While the adjustments do flatten the trend by raising the shares of attached 
firms in the earlier years, the pattern of significant increases in interlocking directorates 
throughout the period remains. 23 
The major effect of the likely undercounting of supervisory board members is thus felt in 
the estimates of supervisory board size and shares of supervisory chairmanships held by 
22The size of the banks' supervisory boards is likewise underestimated. It would be impossible, given the data I 
currently have, to estimate the extent of this bias. However, if we are mainly interested in the representation by those 
with the most influence at the bank, perhaps restricting attention to executive board members and supervisory chairs 
and vice-chairs is appropriate. 
23These calculations are based on the assumption that the share of attached firms whose supervisory chair or vice 
chair was held by a banker board member was approximately the same before 1900 as after. If the actual percentage 
were significantly lower, then the estimates here would continue to understate the representation of banks in the early 
years. However, for there to be no change in the share of bank-interlocked firms over the years before 1901 (that is, to 
remain at the 1905 level of 74%), thirty-two attached firms would have to have been overlooked in 1882. This would 
imply that only 10.8% of attached firms had a banker-held chair or vice-chair. In 1900, the corresponding numbers 
would be 21  overlooked attached firms, and 35% banker-held chair or vice-chair. On the other hand, the true share of 
banker-held chairmanships might also be higher in the early years than later, in which case the adjusted data would 
overstate the extent of interlocking directorates in the early years. 
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concurrent bank board members. It may also underestimate the share of firms with multiple-bank 
contact in the years close to 1900. Given the data available, it is nearly impossible to measure any 
of these effects accurately. 
TABLE V 
PERCENT OF FIRMS WITH INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES--THROUGH-1900 ADJUSTED 
Year Sample I Sample II Sample III 
1882 1 5  0 18  
1886 24 
1890 3 5  
1894 27 29 3 5  
1898 47 
1900 47 65 
1902 60 
1905 74 84 
1906 88 
1910  80 91 88 
B .  Overcounting of interlocking directorates after 1900 
In contrast to the difficulties of the data through 1900, there is no evidence that post-1900 
levels of interlocking directorates are over-estimated. However, one possible explanation for the 
seeming explosion in bank representation is the difficulty in determining whether directors found 
on the boards of both a bank and a firm were agents of the bank or the firm. The extent to which 
banks sent representatives to firms may therefore be over-estimated. Whale warned of this 
confusion: "Particularly misleading results are obtained when the industrialists sitting on bank 
Aufsichtsrate are regarded as bank directors and then all their connections represented as 
ramifications of the banks' interests. "24 
The confusion arises when an individual is a board member at two or more firms and at a 
bank. If his primary allegiance is to one of the firms, then his presence on the board of the other 
24Whale (1930), p.51. 
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firms may be mistaken as representation by the bank on whose board he sits. However, it is 
doubtful that this problem is so extreme as to explain the full increase in the percentage offinns 
with interlocking directorates with a bank after 1900. Furthermore, firm representation at a bank 
without reciprocity would have been unusual, and the presence of an industrialist on a bank board 
of directors is still an indication of a connection between the two entities. Thus, the counting of 
firm representatives causes problems only for those concerned with issues of bank power more 
than with transmission of information between investors and savers. 
Nonetheless, it would be interesting--if only out of curiosity--to determine the prevalence 
of firms with board representation by an industrialist who also sits on a bank board, but without 
any direct connection to a bank Answering this question in any general manner would be nearly 
impossible. One approach for the samples used in this paper is to restrict attention to the 
executive boards and supervisory chairs and vice-chairs in determining the interlocks between the 
banks and firms. Since these are apparently the only positions reported for the years before 1901 ,  
only the shares for the post-1900 period need recalculating. 
The adjusted shares of firms with interlocking directorates are reported in Table VI. As 
with the recalculations in Table V, the trend is flattened, but the overall tendency toward an 
increasing share of firms with interlocking directorates remains. The two adjusted series for 
Sample III are plotted with the original estimates in Figure 2. 
TABLE VI 
PERCENT OF FIRMS WITH INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES--POST- 1900 ADIDSTED 
Year Sample I Sample II Sample III 
1 882 10  0 12  
1886 
1890 
1894 
1898 
1900 
1902 
1905 
1906 
1910  
18  
32 
43 
52 
16 
24 
20 24 
32 
44 
40 
60 
64 
53  64 
24 
Figure 2: Percent of firms with interlocking directorates-adjusted estimates, Sample III 
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C. Importance interlocking directorates in the nineteenth century has been exaggerated 
The share of firms with interlocking directorates appears to be underestimated in the early 
part of the period and perhaps slightly over-estimated in the later part, yet the trend toward 
increasing interaction among bank and firm boards remains. Therefore, the most compelling 
explanation for the surprising patterns found here is that previous work has overstated the 
importance of interlocking directorates at the end of the nineteenth century and has perhaps 
misinterpreted their role in the first part of the twentieth century. Two factors have contributed to 
this problem. First, most investigations into the practices of German banks have been based on 
the experiences of a small number of high-profile firms--Siemens, AEG, Deutch-Lux, for 
example--and an elite group ofindustrialists--Stinnes, Rathenau, Hansemann, and others. Their 
experiences may not generalize well to the remainder of the population. 
Second, modern notions of the importance of universal banking have been heavily 
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ffif:luenced by a small, and probably biased, body of literature. The historiographical lineage can 
be traced back through Gerschenkron (1962) and Schumpeter (1939) to Riesser ( 1910) and 
Jeidels (1905), among others. Jakob Riesser was a well-known Great Bank director, and his 1910  
work i s  the most comprehensive treatment of the subject in English (or German). For both 
reasons, his work has heavily ffifluenced several generations of historians and economists-­
particularly in the United States. While his analysis is accurate for a portion of German firms in 
particular sectors over a limited period of time, his conclusions may no longer hold when 
extrapolated, as they have been, to cover a wide assortment finns and industries since the middle 
of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, repeated quotation and interpretation has tended to 
broaden and exaggerate his original meaning. Riesser does not dwell on the early part of the 
Kaiserreich, and he avoids drawing causal links between bank practices and industrialization. Jn 
fact, in describing the development of the Deutsche Bank, he supports the findings of this paper: 
"The systematic development ofits industrial policy began with the 'bold move' of 1897. During 
the first two decades, however, the bank did little or nothing toward extending its industrial 
connections through the founding or transforming of industrial enterprises. "25 
The essence of both explanations is the same: past investigations have been narrow in 
scope, have exaggerated or misinterpreted the contemporary sources, and have interpreted their 
conclusions too generally. If the biases of previous work are considered, the implications of this 
paper seem less surprising or controversial. 
Finally, though we can be confident that a shift in policy occurred, the reasons behind this 
phenomenon are as yet unexplained. Though continued work on this subject is required to form 
any definitive conclusions, the following observations may shed some light on the question and 
may even offer plausible interpretations of the current findings. 
1. complexity of financial markets and firm structure 
One possibility is that increasing complexity of financial markets at the tum of the century­
-including the expansion of alternative sources of investment funds, growing internal finance by 
25Riesser (1911), p. 476. The 'bold move' of 1897 apparently refers to the launchi.1g of Siemens as a joint-stock 
company, in parallel with a large construction project for the Berlin Hoch- und Untergrundbahn. 
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finns, a more sophisticated investing public, and stock market crashes and economy wide crises in 
the early 1890's and in 190 1--created vigorous competition among banks. Competition, in turn, 
may have led to a perceived need for direct, formalized control via the supervisory board. It 
probably also led to attempts to reduce competition. For example, communities of interest 
(Interessengemeinschaften)--which were often effected through share swaps (and thus board 
representation) increased from 2 at the start of 1897 to 9 at the end of 1900 and to 4 1  by the end 
of 1908. 26 The timing clearly coincides with that of the increases in interlocking directorates 
found in the present samples. 
Also at the tum of the century, the evolution toward the modem enterprise became quite 
pronounced: scale, product diversification, and functional integration all increased. Of the largest 
100 German firms in 1887, only 36  were engaged in 5 or more product groups, whereas in 1907, 
this number had risen to 5 1 . Similarly, the number of firms involved in marketing or in cartels as 
well as in production or raw materials grew from 13 to 64 between 1887 and 1907. Also, the 
share capital of the top one hundred finns ranged from 3 .  8 to approximately 40 million Marks in 
1887, but varied from 10  to 1 80 million Marks in 1907. 27 
Furthermore, the most highly-diversified firms were in the sectors in which the great banks 
were concentrated (except for mining firms, which were mostly involved in 1-4 product groups). 
For example, 45 out of the largest 48 firms in metal, machinery, and electrotechnical 
manufactured 5 or more types of products. In contrast, 14 of the top 17  chemical firms, and all of 
the largest companies in textiles, paper, printing, food and beverages, produced 4 or fewer 
products. 28 Firms that were highly diversified may have presented more opportunities for 
information asymmetry, and thus more need for bank relationships, than single-product firms. 
These organizational and operational changes led to a more hierarchical corporate 
structure, which brought with it salaried managers and the separation of ownership and control. 
The transformation may have also had important implications for corporate finance and the 
26Riesser (1911), p. 664. See also Pohl (1982). 
27From Kocka and Siegrist (1979) pp. 80-81. See also Kocka (1978) on the changes in German corporate structure 
at the tum of the century. 
28Calculated from Kocka and Siegrist (1979), p. 81. 
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relationships  between firms and banks: increasing :financial independence and organizational 
complexity may have hampered the banks' ability to monitor firms effectively, especially in the 
absence of board representation. 
While the forgoing scenarios seem plausible, they fail to explain why--if industrial firms 
were becoming increasingly independent ofbanks--the banks would be able to wrestle away board 
seats from unwilling firms. Perhaps board membership was not an issue of power after all. 
Clearly representation flowed in both directions--to and from the banks. Thus, reciprocal board 
memberships may have arisen out of the desire for mutual oversight and enforcement oflong-term 
relationships (much like the Interessengemeinschaften among the banks). For example, Whale 
(1930) comments in the context ofrelations between the great banks and provincial banks, that 
great banks placed representatives on the boards of the smaller banks "to give the arrangement a 
measure of permanence. " 29 
n. the concentration movement 
A second explanation for the growing prevalence of interlocking directorates around the 
tum of the century may be the concentration movement. The great banks have often been 
assigned credit (or blame) for orchestrating mergers or other combinations from their positions of 
power in a multiplicity of firms. More specifically, the argument would be that the banks took 
seats on several firms in an industry in order to permit monitoring and enforcement of coop erative 
agreements. 
Besides the inconsistency that firm power seems to have been growing (although one 
could counter that firms were purposely tying their own hands by inviting bank oversight), there is 
an additional flaw in this argument. If banks were needed to enforce cartel arrangements in any 
sector, it would seem logical that they would prove most crucial in industries in which self­
monitoring was the most difficult--for example, competitive, homogeneous goods-producing 
sectors. Banks would not offer the greatest disciplinary benefits to heavy industry or electro­
technicals--sectors that represented' a small fraction of all German :firmS, but whose average 
29Whale (1930), p.  29. 
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share-capital was among the highest. 30 
If growing board representation were seen as the result and not the cause of 
concentration, then the contemporaneous increases in concentration and interlocking directorships 
in heavy industry would make more sense. Combinations among mining and metal or electro­
technical firms often required major financial backing, and the banks involved often garnered 
board seats because of their financial participation. Indeed, in several well-known cases the great 
banks played important roles, yet this does not imply that the banks instigated or enforced the 
combination. 31 Riesser (19 1 1) recounts the backing of the L. Loewe Group by the Disconto 
Gesellschaft consortium of banks in 1900: 
"It appears that since the nineties the ever-increasing extension of the plant and the annexing of a 
number of hitherto independent concerns made it impossible to have the largely increased demands 
for capital met either by the original firm of by any single banking institution, the latter partly for the 
reason that a number of banking institutions were simultaneously interested in several enterprises of 
the electro-technical industry. " 
The backing of industrial groups--operations that clearly encouraged multiple bank contact--were 
not common until the very end of the nineteenth century and into the beginning of the twentieth; 
providing further support for the finding that in all three samples interlocking directorates with a 
variety of banks increased rapidly after the tum of the century. 
m. signalling and proxies 
The first two explanations for the expansion in interlocking directorates center around 
issues of monitoring, but there are other possible reasons for the observed patterns. For example, 
firms may have found it useful for attracting investors to have well-known bank directors on their 
boards. A banker's presence may have served as a seal of approval--signaling the firm's quality to 
the market. To account for the trend toward greater bank-firm interaction, however, the 
importance of reputation would have to have been increasing over the period. 
Finally, even ignoring reputation effects, the simple fact that shareholders often gave their 
proxy to a bank may explain part ofthe apparent increase in bank•finn interaction. The more 
30See Sombart (1909, 1913, 1927) and Wagon (1903). 
31See Wellhoner (1989) on the cases of several major firms in heavy industry. 
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firms with the joint-stock fonn, and the larger the firms' share capital, the greater the potential 
was for large numbers of shareholders to tum over their voting rights to banks. 
The rapid growth in the number and size of initial public offerings around the tum of the 
century, and the concomitant demand for quality signaling and proxy votes, might explain part of 
the increase in interlocking directorates. Table VII illustrates this point. According to these 
figures, joint-stock capital floated between 1895 and 190 1 tripled that which was issued in the 
previous twenty years. 
TABLE VII 
JOINT-STOCK FLOTATIONS, 1 888-1895 
Years Total Average 
firms floated share ca:Qital 
1874-1 894 122. 3 8  890.48 
1888-1894 179. 14 894.29 
1895-1901  244. 14 1 3 92. 86 
Source: Deutscher Okonomist, as cited in Riesser (1911). Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften 
gives similar, though not identical, numbers for 1899-1911. 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper has shown that the institution of interlocking directorates was a dynamic one in 
Germany over the thirty years around the tum of the century. The data demonstrates marked 
growth in the formalized interaction between banks and industrial firms toward the late nineties 
and after 1900--a trend that runs counter to the generally-accepted assumptions about the role of 
the universal banks in the German industrialization. 
In order to determine which of the foregoing hypotheses provides the best explanation for 
the patterns of interlocking directorates uncovered in this paper, further research is needed. 
Particularly useful might be case studies of several (perhaps randomly-selected) individual firms 
that entered into interlocking directorates with: one or more hanks during the period. At a general 
level, limited dependent variable methods would likely provide a more detailed understanding of 
the characteristics--including size, sector, location, and capital requirements--of firms that had 
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interlocking directorates with banks. 32 Also, since the firms discussed here were sampled from 
those traded in Berlin only, the potential overcounting of bank relationships in the full population 
of joint-stock :firms should also be investigated. Investigation into the corporate governance of 
unlisted firms might prove especially fruitful. 
Many of the proposed justifications for increasing bank-firm interaction relate to economic 
changes outside of the control ofbanks--suggesting that further investigation into the potentially­
changing function of interlocking directorates is also warranted. For example, the notions that 
bank-firm relationships reduced asymmetric information and permitted more efficient investment, 
or that long-term relationships committed banks and :firms to act in the interest of the long-term 
despite short-run costs, may be called into question. 33 
A related question, deserving of close scrutiny, is that of the role of informal relationships 
between financiers and industrialists in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. While familial or 
social ties are exceedingly difficult to spot and quantify on a comprehensive scale, we may find 
that they were more important to nineteenth-century German industrialization than the legal 
relationship represented by Aufsichtsrat representation. If this is the case, then it casts doubt on 
the principal that universal banking--and the specific legal structures of which the system was 
comprised--was the key to German industrialization. 
32LDV analysis for Samples I and II is provided in Fohlin (1994a). 
330n bank attachment and firm liquidity constraints, see Fohlin (1994b ). 
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